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An economy is in a liquidity trap when monetary policy cannot influence either real or
nominal variables of interest.  A necessary condition for this is that the short nominal interest
rate is constrained by its lower bound, typically zero.  The paper considers two small
analytical models, one Old-Keynesian, the other New-Keynesian possessing equilibria where
not only the short nominal interest rate, but nominal interest rates at all maturities can be
stuck at their zero lower bound.
When the authorities remove the zero nominal interest rate floor by adopting an
augmented monetary rule that systematically keeps the nominal interest rate on base money
(including currency) at or below the nominal interest rate on non-monetary instruments, the
lower bound equilibria are eliminated, thus allowing an economic system to avoid the trap or
to escape from it.  This rule will involve paying negative interest on currency, that is,
imposing a ‘carry tax’ on currency, an idea first promoted by Gesell.  The administration
costs associated with a currency carry tax must be set against the benefits of potentially lower
shoe-leather costs and lower menu costs which are made possible by the its introduction.
There are also output-gap avoidance benefits from eliminating the zero lower bound trap.
Willem H. Buiter, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, One Exchange
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Equation Section (Next)(I) Introduction
The liquidity trap used to be a standard topic in macroeconomic theory.  The textbook
treatment of liquidity traps was based on Hicks's [1936] interpretation of Keynes [1936], and
involved the assumption that the demand for money balances would become infinitely
responsive to its opportunity cost, proxied by the nominal interest rate, at some low level of
that nominal interest rate.
12 In a liquidity trap, private agents would willingly absorb any
amount of real money balances without changing their behaviour in any other respect.  In
most modern theories, the short riskless nominal interest rate on government debt is the
opportunity cost of holding currency, and the floor on the short nominal interest rate is
typically taken to be zero (the ‘zero lower bound’).  The nominal yield on short government
debt is then related to yields on other assets through a variety of equilibrium asset pricing
relationships.
During the inflationary 1970s and 1980s, liquidity traps and the lower bound on short
nominal interest rates ceased to be of concern to policy makers and to scholars other than
economic historians and historians of economic thought.  In the mainstream accounts of the
monetary transmission mechanism, the liquidity trap was treated as a theoretical curiosum.
3
Since the late 1990s, there has been a revival of interest from scholars and from monetary
policy makers in the liquidity trap in general, and the zero lower bound on the nominal rate of
                                                          
1 The maturity of the interest rate was left rather vague.  In later interpretations, the infinite
interest elasticity of money demand involved a long nominal rate of interest; the demand for
money becomes infinitely sensitive to the current value of this long nominal yield because of
regressive (what we now call ‘mean reverting’) expectations about the future behaviour of
short interest rates (see e.g. Tobin [1958] and Laidler [1993]).
2 There was no presumption that this floor to the nominal rate of interest would be at zero.
3 See e.g. Romer [2001], which covers the topic as half of an exercise at the end of the
chapter 5, "Traditional Keynesian Theories of Fluctuations".2
interest in particular.
4  As has so often been the case in monetary economics, scholarly interest
was prompted by unfamiliar and unexpected empirical observations and by the needs of
monetary policy makers who experienced or feared the loss of the standard instrument of
monetary policy in economies with developed financial systems – the short nominal rate of
interest.
The reality of the zero lower bound is an economic policy issue in Japan.  The risk of
the zero lower bound becoming a binding constraint on monetary policy has become a factor
in Western Europe and the United States of America.  Japan is in a protracted, ten-year old
economic slump.  Short nominal interest rates there are near zero.  A number of observers
have concluded that there is a liquidity trap at work (see e.g. Krugman [1998a,b,c,d; 1999],
Ito [1998], McKinnon and Ohno [1999] and Svensson [2000]); for a view that liquidity traps
are unlikely to pose a problem, see Meltzer [1999] and Hondroyiannis, Swamy and Tavlas
[2000]).
In Euroland inflation, on the HIPC measure, averaged 1.1 percent per annum during
1999.  The ECB’s repo rate reached a trough of 2.5 percent during April 1999.  At the time,
this raised the question as to whether a margin of two hundred and fifty basis points provides
enough insurance against a slump in aggregate demand.  Today (mid-2002) the ECB’s repo
rate stands at 3.25 percent and inflation runs at around 2.0 percent per annum.  While this
appears to provide a reasonable cushion against the risk of getting stuck at the zero lower
bound, the fear of deflation has not vanished completely.
                                                          
4 Recent theoretical analyses of liquidity traps include Wolman [1998], Buiter and
Panigirtzoglou [1999], McCallum [2000, 2001], Cristiano [2000], Porter [1999], and
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [1999a,b].  Recent empirical investigations of the issue
include Fuhrer and Madigan [1997], Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [1999], Johnson, Small and
Tryon [1999], Clouse, Henderson, Orphanides, Small and Tinsley [1999], Iwata and Wu
[2001].3
Finally, in the US too, with the Federal Funds rate in HI 2002 down at 1.75 per cent as
a result of the recession and the events of 11 September 2001, the Fed has shown some
concern about the possibility that monetary policy could become constrained by a lower
bound on nominal interest rates.  As early as the Fall of 1999, the Fed organised a conference
to discuss the ‘zero bound problem’ and recently its staff have produced a thorough study of
Japan’s experience in the 1990s and the lessons this holds for preventing deflation (Ahearne
et. al. [2002]).
5
The terms ‘monetary policy’ and ‘liquidity trap’ means different things to different
people.  We shall offer definitions, but consider the concepts to be more important than the
labels.  Monetary policy changes the composition of the government’s financial liabilities
between monetary and non-monetary financial instruments for a given aggregate stock of
financial liabilities (monetary plus non-monetary).  Changes in the magnitude of the
government’s aggregate financial liabilities are the province of intertemporal fiscal policy.
We consider an economy to be in a liquidity trap when monetary policy cannot stimulate
aggregate demand through any channel.
A necessary condition for such monetary policy ineffectiveness is that monetary
policy cannot influence the cost, availability or liquidity of funds to enterprises and
consumers.
6  It is not sufficient, because monetary policy can be argued to operate also
through channels like wealth effects or the real balance/Pigou effect.  In contrast to an open
                                                          
5 The proceedings of the conference were published in the Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking [2002].  Other studies by Federal Reserve Board staff members of monetary policy
near the zero lower bound include Orphanides and Wieland [1998, 2000].
6 More generally, a necessary condition for monetary policy ineffectiveness is that monetary
policy cannot affect the joint distribution of real and nominal rates of return on financial and
real assets.  When monetary policy also works through channels other than rates of return
(say, through the availability as well as the cost of credit, or through the exchange rate), a
liquidity trap is operative only if these additional liquidity, credit or exchange rate channels of
monetary transmission too are blocked.  The exchange rate channel is discussed extensively
in McCallum [2000,2002].4
market purchase of public debt, which would be monetary policy according to our definition,
a Friedman-style ‘helicopter drop of money’ would by us be considered a combination of
fiscal and monetary policy, as it involves a capital transfer from the monetary authorities to
the recipients.
The modern ‘zero bound’ argument assumes explicitly (and the traditional theories
assumed implicitly) that the pecuniary (financial) rate of return on money is zero, an
appropriate assumption for coin and currency, although not for the liabilities of private
deposit-taking institutions that make up most of the broader monetary aggregates.  The latter
now typically have positive nominal returns.  With the nominal rate of return on currency
administratively fixed at zero, a floor to the spread between the non-monetary and monetary
claims becomes a floor to the nominal yields on non-monetary financial instruments.
In Section II we revisit an old proposal, which we attribute to Silvio Gesell, for
removing the zero lower bound on the nominal rate of interest on non-monetary assets by
paying negative nominal interest rates on base money – currency (including vault cash) and
commercial bank balances (electronic bank reserves) held at the central bank.
7  Goodfriend
[2000] contains an extensive discussion of the practicalities of paying negative interest on
currency and electronic bank reserves by levying a “carry tax”.  Like him, we conclude that
such a carry tax is feasible (simple for bank reserves, awkward for currency) and that it could
be more efficient than a policy of minimising the risk of hitting the zero lower bound by
keeping the inflation target and the inflation rate sufficiently high (see also Bryant [2000] and
Freedman [2000]).
The administrative problems associated with paying negative interest on base money,
that is, taxing the holding of base money, are due to the fact that one component of base5
money, coin and currency, are fiat bearer bonds.  This means that the owner of the coins and
currency is anonymous - the identity of the holder is unknown to the issuer, the central bank.
It is difficult to tax an asset when the identity of its owner is unknown to the tax authority.  A
way must be found for the owner of the currency to reveal himself to pay the tax.  The other
component of the monetary base, (electronic) commercial bank reserves with the central bank
poses no problems as regards the payment of negative (or positive) interest.  Commercial
bank reserves with the central bank are registered financial claims: the identity of the owner
is known to the issuer.  It is no more difficult for the central bank to pay negative (or positive)
interest on commercial bank reserves with the central bank than it is for commercial banks to
pay negative (or positive) interest on demand deposits or time deposits.
In Section III we use two standard small macroeconomic models to show how, with an
exogenous nominal interest on currency (zero, say) and with the short nominal interest rate on
non-monetary government debt determined by a simple Taylor rule, the zero lower bound on
the nominal interest rate can become a binding constraint, and how under these conditions
conventional monetary policy (working through changes in the current short nominal interest
rate or by changes in current and anticipated future short nominal rates) becomes powerless.
We then show how, by paying negative interest on currency, the zero lower bound constraint
is eliminated and the associated zero lower bound trap ceases to exist.  The first model is old-
Keynesian, with a conventional IS curve and a backward-looking accelerationist Phillips
curve.  The second model is New-Keynesian, with a forward-looking IS curve and Calvo’s
version of the staggered, overlapping price setting model, which implies a forward-looking
accelerationist Phillips curve.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7 In principle, negative interest might have to be paid on coin as well.  However, as pointed
out in Porter [1999] and Goodfriend [2000], the carry cost of coins are sufficiently high that
they would not be an attractive store of value for large sums.6
When interest rates are constrained at their lower bound, expansionary fiscal policy, or
any other exogenous shock to aggregate demand, is supposed to be at its most effective.  This
is obviously the case for our old-Keynesian model.  Even our new-Keynesian model, which
exhibits Ricardian equivalence or debt neutrality, has the property that aggregate demand is
boosted temporarily by a temporary increase in public spending on goods and services.  For
this fiscal policy channel to be ineffective also, public spending on goods and services must
be a direct perfect substitute for private spending on goods and services, say because public
consumption is a perfect substitute for private consumption in private utility functions, and/or
public sector capital is a perfect substitute for private capital in private production functions.
8
The main results of the paper are the following:
First, the zero lower bound on the nominal rate of interest can be eliminated
completely by the payment of a negative rate of interest on base money, that is, by imposing a
carry tax on base money.  By following a policy that maintains the short nominal interest rate
on base money at or below the short nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial
instruments, all real economic variables of the economic system, except for the stock of real
money balances, but including the rate of inflation,
9 behave as they would if the nominal
interest rate on base money were zero and there were no non-negativity constraint on the short
nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial instruments.
Second, one component of base money, commercial banks’ balances with the central
bank, can pay negative interest easily and at little or no cost.  The second component,
currency, could pay negative interest but at some, probably significant, administrative cost.
These administrative costs of paying a negative nominal interest rate on currency are distinct
from the familiar ‘shoe-leather cost’ of managing money balances and from the menu costs of
                                                          
8See Buiter [1977].7
any non-zero rate of inflation.  It is indeed possible both to eliminate the zero bound on the
nominal interest rate by paying negative interest on currency and to eliminate ‘shoe-leather
costs’ by closing the gap between the short nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial
instruments and the nominal interest rate on currency, thus achieving satiation with real
money balances.
Third, the formal models considered in the paper have the property that, when the
nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial instruments is government by a Taylor rule
and the nominal interest rate on base money is exogenous (say, zero), an increase in the target
rate of inflation – a key parameter of the Taylor rule – will not help the economy escape from
a situation where nominal interest rates at all maturities are at their lower (zero) bound.
(II) Paying negative interest on base money
The nominal rate of return on base money (coin, currency and commercial bank
balances with the central bank) net of carry costs (costs of storage, taxes etc), sets a floor
under the nominal rates of return net of carry costs on all other assets.  The fundamental ‘no
arbitrage’ axiom of finance theory provides the reason.  No rational economic agent will hold
a store of value that is (net) rate-of-return-dominated by another store of value.  Base money
is the most liquid store of value.  Its advantages as medium of exchange and means of
payment (often enhanced by its official status as legal tender) means that a rational economic
agent will not hold any asset other than base money, unless that alternative store of value
promises a pecuniary return at least as high as base money.  If the nominal interest rate on
bonds were to be below the nominal interest rate on base money by more than the carry cost
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9 Strictly speaking, real consumption, real output, the real interest rate, the nominal interest
rate and the inflation rate.  The stock of real money balances will depend on  M ii − .8
differential, any rational private agent would wish to borrow an infinite amount by issuing
bonds, in order to build up infinite holdings of base money.
Interest rates must of course be adjusted for carry costs to obtain the relevant net
financial rates of return.  Carry costs for coins are non-trivial.  Storage costs for coins are
sufficiently high to rule out their widespread use as a store of value if the nominal interest rate
on bills and bonds were to go to zero.  For that reason, coins will be ignored in what follows.
Storage cost for commercial bank reserves with the central bank (entries in an
electronic ledger) are very low.
10  For simplicity, we can take them to be zero.  The carry cost
of currency, including vault cash is non-negligible, if one allows not just for the cost of
physical storage, but also for the cost of insuring against loss, damage or theft.  Carry costs on
non-monetary government securities (bills or bonds) are low and are more like a fixed than a
variable cost.  Let i denote the instantaneous nominal interest rate on non-monetary
government debt (‘short bonds’),  C i  the nominal interest rate on currency,  R i  the nominal
interest rate on commercial bank reserves with the central bank, γ  the (instantaneous)
marginal carry costs of bonds,  C γ  the instantaneous marginal carry cost of currency and  R γ
the instantaneous marginal carry cost on commercial bank reserves with the central bank.
Then the superior liquidity of base money will set the following floor on the nominal interest
rate on bonds:
Max{ , } CC RR ii i γγ γγ ≥+ − + − (1)
In the formal models of Section III, we omit explicit consideration of the three carry
cost terms, γ ,  C γ  and  R γ .  We also treat base money as if it were a homogeneous aggregate
rather than the sum of two distinct components, currency and commercial bank balances with
                                                          
10 The main cost will be that of ensuring the security and integrity of the electronic balances.
These costs are mainly overhead costs for the electronic ledger as a whole, and will be
independent of the amount of reserves kept in any particular electronic ledger entry.9
the central bank.  Since  CR γγ γ >≥ , the true floor for the short nominal interest rate is likely
to be slightly below zero if no nominal interest in paid on either base money component.  For
the purpose of this paper, these are matters of no real significance, so in what follows we have
a single nominal interest rate on base money,  M i , that is, we set  MCR iii ==  and we assume
0 CR γγ γ === .  Equation (1) therefore becomes
M ii ≥ (2)
The key message of this paper is that the zero bound on the nominal interest rate can
be overcome, indeed eliminated and that zero bound traps can be avoided by paying a
negative nominal interest rate on base money.  This message is valid for any model in which
the simple but fundamental ‘no arbitrage’ condition applies that  rules out a negative
pecuniary opportunity cost of holding base money.  It holds for models with ‘money in the
direct utility function’, as long as the marginal utility of money cannot become negative.  It
holds for models with ‘money in the production function’ as long as the marginal revenue
product of money cannot become negative.  It holds for ‘shopping models’ of money in which
cash permits shoppers to economise on time or other valuable resources, as long as the
marginal transaction cost savings or shopping cost savings of money cannot become negative.
It also holds for cash-in-advance models.
It should be noted that paying a negative nominal interest rate on base money is
exactly the same thing as levying a carry tax on base money, a measure proposed and
analysed in detail by Goodfriend [2000].  Indeed in earlier versions of this paper (Buiter and
Panigirtzoglou [1999]), we pointed out that the way policy makers can achieve a negative
(positive) net nominal yield on base money is by taxing (subsidising) base money.  We called
base money carrying a negative nominal interest rate Gesell money and the carry tax the10
Gesell tax, after Silvio Gesell (1862-1930), a German-Argentine businessman and economist
who was probably the best-known proponent of taxing currency (see Gesell [1949]).
The nominal interest rate floor at zero is not a technological, immovable barrier.  It is
the result of a political and administrative choice - the decision by governments or central
banks to set the administered nominal interest rate on coin, currency and commercial bank
reserves with the central bank at zero.
11
There are two reasons why interest is not paid on coin and currency.
 12  The first, and
currently less important one in advanced industrial countries, has to do with the attractions of
seigniorage (issuing non-interest-bearing monetary liabilities) as a source of government
revenue in a historical environment of positive short nominal rates on non-monetary
government debt.
13  The second, and more important reason why no interest (positive or
negative) is paid on coin and currency, are the practical, administrative difficulties of paying a
negative interest rate on bearer bonds.  Significant costs are involved both for the state and for
private agents.  These costs are there because of a fundamental information asymmetry.
In order to pay a positive rate of interest on a financial instrument (security), it must be
possible to for the issuer (and for a third party like a court of law) to determine
unambiguously whether interest due on any particular quantity of that security has been paid
by the holder (owner).  Unless this can be established unequivocally, the security in question
could be presented multiple times for payment, by the same or by different owners.
14  In order
to pay a negative interest rate on a financial instrument, the issuer (and a third party like a
                                                          
11 Certain countries at certain times have paid positive nominal interest on commercial bank
reserves with the central bank.
12 From here on, ‘currency’ will be taken to include both coin and currency.  There obviously
are more severe technical problems with attaching coupons or stamps to coin than to currency
notes.
13Of course, issuing negative interest-bearing monetary liabilities would be even more
attractive, from a seigniorage point of view.
14 Clipping coupons is a traditional way to ensure that interest is paid only once.11
court of law) must be able to determine whether any particular quantity of that security has
had the interest due on it paid by the owner to the issuer.  The owner has to be able to
establish unambiguously that interest due to the issuer has been paid.  The issuer must create
an incentive for the owner to reveal himself and pay the interest due to the issuer.
The problem with paying any kind of interest, positive or negative, on coin and
currency is that they are bearer securities – or bearer bonds.  A bearer bond is a debt security
in paper or electronic form whose ownership is transferred by delivery rather than by written
notice and amendment to the register of ownership.  We shall refer to all securities that are
not bearer bonds as registered securities.  Bearer bonds are negotiable, just as e.g. money
market instruments such as Treasury Bills, bank certificates of deposit, and bills of exchange
are negotiable.  Coin and currency therefore are bearer bonds issued by the central bank.
They are obligations of the state, made payable not to a named individual or other legal entity,
but to whoever happens to present it for payment - the bearer.  The owners of the securities
are anonymous, unknown to the issuer.  If a security cannot be clearly linked to a known
owner, it must instead be possible to ascertain from the security itself whether interest due has
been paid.  The security must be unambiguously ‘marked’ or identified when interest due is
paid.
In order to provide appropriate incentives for the holders of currency to make a
payment to the issuer, the issuer or its agents must be able to impose a sufficient penalty on
anyone holding currency that cannot be unambiguously identified as current on all interest
due.  Confiscation without compensation would be one example of such a penalty.  It would
only work, of course, if the probability of apprehension is high enough.  Gesell proposed
physically stamping currency to provide evidence that negative interest had been paid - a
negative interest rate analogue to the coupon-clipping solution for positive interest payments.12
Special mechanisms for removing the zero nominal interest rate floor by taxing
currency are not required for the other component of the monetary base: commercial banks’
balances with the central bank.  These balances are not bearer bonds, but registered securities,
in the terminology of this paper.  There is no practical or administrative barrier to paying
negative nominal interest rates (whether market-determined or administered) on registered
securities, including balances held in registered accounts, such as bank accounts.  Positive
interest payments or negative interest payments just involve simple book-keeping
transactions, debits or credits, between accounts owned by known parties.  With the identities
of both issuer and holder (debtor and creditor) known or easily established, it is not difficult
to verify whether interest due has been paid and received.
Removing the zero floor on nominal interest rates by taxing currency is not
complicated by the existence of a private banking sector that issues demand and time
deposits, certificates of deposits etc., and that operates in the interbank market (this point has
been made effectively in Goodfriend [2000]).  All bank deposits and all financial instruments
traded in the Federal Funds market and in the interbank market are, in our terminology,
registered financial instruments.  There would be no need for the state to tax them in order to
achieve negative nominal interest rates.  Simple arbitrage would propagate the
administratively imposed negative interest rates on currency and commercial bank balances
with the central bank to repo rates, market-determined bank deposit rates, rates on financial
instruments traded in the Federal Funds market or in the interbank market, and rates on
private electronic or e-money, including ‘money on a chip’, internet accounts etc.
15
There are costs associated with administering a carry tax on currency that will not be
negligible even if one can come up with a slightly higher-tech (and tamper-proof) alternative
                                                          
15 It would be no harder for the Bank of England or the European Central Bank to impose a
negative interest rate in their repo operations than it is to achieve a positive interest rate.13
to physically stamping currency.  These carry tax administration costs have to be set against
the benefits of removing the zero floor to the nominal interest rate and the costs associated
with the other method for reducing the likelihood of monetary policy being constrained by the
zero bound.  An example is a monetary policy that consistently produces sufficiently high
nominal interest rates to reduce to a very low level the likelihood of the zero bound constraint
becoming binding.  The fact that high inflation leads to high nominal interest rates is good
from the point of view of avoiding the zero lower bound, but it is costly from the point of
view of Baily-Friedman-Allais-Baumol-Tobin shoe-leather cost of cash management (see
Bailey [1956], Friedman [1969], Fischer [1981, 1994], Baumol and Tobin [1989]).  A
complete analysis should also consider menu costs, which are present whenever the inflation
rate is non-zero and which increase with the frequency with which prices are changed, that is,
with the absolute value of the rate of inflation.
There are costs to taxing currency other than carry tax administration costs, and
benefits other than the avoidance of shoe-leather costs and menu costs.  Taxing currency
would be regressive, since only the relatively poor hold a significant fraction of their wealth
in currency.  Taxing currency would also, however, constitute a tax on the grey, black and
outright criminal economies, which are heavily cash-based.  In the case of the US dollar, with
most US currency held abroad (one assumes mainly by non-US residents), it would represent
a means of increasing external seigniorage.
(III) Taxing Currency, the Zero Lower Bound and the Liquidity
Trap in Old- and New-Keynesian Models.
III.1 The zero bound equilibrium in an Old-Keynesian model
                                                                                                                                                                                    14
Consider a simple IS-LM model with an accelerationist Phillips curve.  The following
notation is used:  y  is real GDP, r  is the short real rate of interest,  f  represents the
exogenous or autonomous determinants of aggregate demand,  / mM P ≡  is the real value of
the stock of currency (M is the nominal stock of currency and P the general price level); i is
the short nominal interest rate,  M i  is the nominal interest rate on currency,  / P P π ≡   is the
rate of inflation;  y  is the exogenous and constant level of real capacity output, 
* π is the long-
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In this Old-Keynesian model, both the price level, P, and the rate of inflation, π , are
assumed to be predetermined and output is demand-determined.  Equation (3) is a standard IS
curve, making aggregate demand a decreasing function of the real interest rate.  The
exogenous demand driver, f, includes the fiscal determinants of aggregate demand.
Equation (4) is a standard LM curve, with the demand for currency proportional to
real income and decreasing in the opportunity cost of holding currency,  M ii − .  Note that, if
ii M < , currency would dominate non-monetary financial assets (‘bonds’) as a store of value.
Portfolio holders would wish to take infinite long positions in currency, financed by infinite
short positions in non-monetary securities.  The rate of return on such a portfolio would be
infinite.  This cannot be an equilibrium.  If ii M = , currency and bonds are perfect substitutes
as stores of value.  In Section III.2, we derive a money demand function similar to (4) in the
context of an optimising model of consumer behaviour.  It is clear in such a model that, from
the point of view of the optimal quantity of money, the Bailey-Friedman rule,  M ii = , will
characterise the first-best equilibrium.
Equation (5) is a backward-looking accelerationist Phillips curve: the predetermined
rate of inflation increases (decreases) when actual output is above (below) capacity output.
Equation (7) has the monetary authorities following a simplified Taylor rule for the
short nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial claims, as long as this does not put the
short nominal interest rate below the interest rate on currency.  A standard Taylor rule for the
short nominal bond rate which restricts the short nominal bond rate not to be below the short
nominal rate on currency, would be16
** **
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Equation (8) specifies that δ  is the steady-state real interest rate in the normal case,
when the zero lower bound is not binding.  This normal long-run real interest rate is
endogenous in our model.
16  The Taylor rule has the property that in the long run, when
inflation is at its target level and output equals capacity output, the nominal interest rate
equals the long-run real interest rate plus the target rate of inflation.  In the short run, the
nominal interest rate rises more than one-for-one with the actual rate of inflation.  This means
that the short real interest rate rises whenever the inflation rate rises, providing a stabilising
policy feedback mechanism.  The nominal interest rate also rises with the output gap.
For our purposes, all that matters is the responsiveness of the short nominal interest
rate to the inflation rate.  We therefore omit feedback from the output gap in what follows,
that is, we set  0 ρ = .  The short nominal interest rate rule then simplifies to (7).
When the nominal interest rate on currency is exogenous (say zero), the behaviour
over time of the economy is captured by the following switching differential equation:
* ˆ (1 )( ) if  
ˆ () i f M if y
παβγππ ππ





-1 * ˆ [( 1 ) ] M i π γ δ γ π ≡− + − (12)
When the inflation rate is above the critical value  ˆ π  (we shall refer to this as the
‘normal zone￿), the lower bound on the nominal interest rate is not binding, and the Taylor
                                                          
16 Substituting the definition of the real interest rate (6), the Taylor rule (7) and the definition
of the steady-state real interest rate (8), into the IS equation (3), gives an aggregate demand
equation that, because of the interest rate rule, is independent of f, the exogenous component
of aggregate demand: 
* (1 )( ) yy α γ ππ =+ − − .  Nothing of importance for our purposes17
rule is operative.  When the inflation rate is at or below  ˆ π  (we shall refer to this as the ￿lower
bound zone￿), the lower bound constraint on the short nominal interest rate is binding and the
short nominal interest rate is given by  M ii = .  Figure 1 shows the behaviour of the model in
these two regimes.  There are two stationary equilibria: 
* ππ =  in the normal zone and
**
M i ππ δ =≡ −  in the lower bound zone.  We assume that 
*
M i πδ >− .  If this is not the
case, the monetary authorities will have parameterised their interest rate rules in such a way
that the target rate of inflation (which is also the long-run rate of inflation in the normal zone)
is below the long-run rate of inflation in the lower bound zone.  This does not seem plausible,
although the analysis of this case is straightforward.
17
The normal steady state, 
* ππ = , is locally stable.  The lower bound steady state,
** ππ = , is locally unstable.  Any initial rate of inflation above 
** π  will converge to the
normal steady state 
* ππ = .  If the initial rate of inflation were to be above 
** π  but below  ˆ π ,
the system would first move towards B along the divergent trajectory drawn with reference to
** π .  When  ˆ ππ = , it will switch to the convergent trajectory drawn with reference to 
* π .
Any initial rate of inflation below the lower bound steady state 
** π would result in cumulative
further disinflation and, sooner or later, increasing rates of deflation.
Note that, if the economy is in a deflationary spiral with 
** ππ < , raising the target rate
of inflation, 
* π , will not help.  The lower bound solution trajectory ABE and the lower bound
steady state inflation rate, 
** π , are unaffected by 
* π .  Only the normal solution trajectory
DBC is affected by an increase in the target rate of inflation: it shifts horizontally to the right
by the same amount as the increase in 
* π .
                                                                                                                                                                                    
depends on this assumed endogeneity of δ .  With δ  exogenous, equation (11) for  ˆ ππ ≥
would become 
* (1 )( ) ( ) fy παβγππ β αδ =−− +− − 
17 From an initial rate of inflation above 
** π  (in the case where 
** * ππ > ) we would have a
steadily increasing rate of inflation.18
A simple modification (or amplification) of the Taylor rule that eliminates the lower
bound problem completely is as follows.  The exogenous own nominal interest rate
assumption for money in (9) is replaced by equation (10).  The Taylor rule for the short
nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial instruments continues to be given, as before,
by equation (7).  The rest of the model is as before.  Note, however, that there is now no
restriction on the domain of the nominal interest rate function.  Equation (10) ensures that the
constraint that the short nominal interest rate on non-monetary instruments cannot fall below
the nominal interest rate on currency never becomes binding.  The lower bound zone in
Figure 1 has been eliminated.  For all values of π , the only solution now is the stable
trajectory shown in Figure 1 as DBC through 
* π , the map of 
* (1 )( ) παβγππ =−−  .  There
no longer is a lower bound steady state 
** π .
Only the simplest kind of rule, maintaining a constant wedge (possibly zero) between
the two interest rates is considered here, but it does the job of eliminating completely the
lower bound constraint.
18  The rule for the two short nominal interest rates given in equations
(7) and (10) may require the payment of non-zero (positive or negative) interest rates on base
money.  Through the carry tax on base money, the opportunity cost of holding base money,
M ii − , can be uncoupled from the nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial
instruments, from the inflation rate and from the real rate of interest.
Finally, note that  0 M ii ν ≡− = , that is, a zero opportunity cost of holding currency, is
part of the range of values for the wedge between the short nominal interest rate on non-
monetary financial instruments and the nominal interest rate on currency that eliminates
equilibria for which the lower bound constraint is binding.  Satiation with real money
                                                          
18 Note that, because the opportunity cost of holding money,  M ii − , is positive and constant,
the ratio of real money balances to consumption will also be constant in this model.19
balances, the Bailey-Friedman optimal quantity of money rule, can now be achieved without
the monetary authorities giving up control over the level of the nominal rate of interest, if a
carry tax can be levied on currency.
III.2 The zero bound equilibrium in a New-Keynesian model
The model presented in this subsection is, except for one simple but crucial
modification – the explicit consideration of a carry tax on currency, or a negative interest rate
on currency – the same as the new-Keynesian models of a closed economy analysed by
McCallum [2000, 2001] and by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [1999a,b] (henceforth
BSU).  The ‘IS curve’ is forward-looking, through an Euler equation for private consumption
growth.  The inflation process is Calvo’s [1983] forward-looking New-Keynesian Phillips
curve with the general price level predetermined but the rate of inflation non-predetermined.
We model a closed endowment economy with a single perishable commodity that can
be consumed privately or publicly, and with two stores of value, currency which can only be
issued by the government, and risk-free non-monetary nominal debt (bonds).  We use the
following notation in addition to that already introduced in Section III.1: c is real private
consumption and g  is real government consumption.  The model consists of equations (6),
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The derivation of the consumption Euler equation (13) and the money demand
function (14) can be found in Appendix 1.  The parameter δ  (the long-run real interest rate of
the old-Keynesian model) now has the interpretation of the household’s pure rate of time
preference.
19  It is a constant now.  The derivation of (16), which is implied by Calvo’s model
of staggered, overlapping price setting, can be found in Appendix 2 (see Calvo [1983]).  Note
that  0 β < : the short-run Phillips curve appears to have the ‘wrong’ slope.  This is a paradox
only until one realises that the inflation rate is forward-looking:
() [ () ] l i m ()
t
ty s y d s τ π β πτ
∞
→∞ =− − +  .
In the New-Keynesian variant too, output is demand-determined, and the price level,
P, is predetermined.  However, the growth rate of the price level, the rate of inflation, π, is
non-predetermined.
20
The behaviour of the economy when the interest rate on currency is exogenous (that
is, when  M i  is given by equation (9)) can be summarised in two first-order differential
equations in the two non-predetermined state variable c and π .  The equation governing the
behaviour of private consumption growth switches when the lower bound on the short
nominal interest rate becomes binding.
() cgy π β =+ −  (17)
                                                          
19 The long-run real interest rate equals ρ  in this New-Keynesian model also.
20 Because in Calvo’s model, the general price level, P, is a predetermined state variable, but
its proportional rate of change, π , is a non-predetermined state variable, costless disinflation
is possible.  The sacrifice ratio is zero (see e.g. Buiter and Miller [1985]).21
()
* ˆ ( 1)( ) if  









We can partition c π −  space into a normal zone, where the lower bound on the
nominal interest rate is not a binding constraint (that is, where, as in the Old-Keynesian
example, 
-1 * ˆ [( 1 ) ] M i ππ γ δ γ π ≥≡ −+− ) and a lower bound zone where the constraint is
binding (that is, where  ˆ ππ < ).
In the new-Keynesian model too there are two steady state inflation rates - the normal
steady state with 
* ππ =  and lower bound steady state with 
**
M i ππ δ == − .  Again we
assume that 
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=+ ∞ (19)
Note that steady-state household utility is higher in the lower bound equilibrium than
in the normal equilibrium, unless 
*
M i δπ += , in which case utility is the same in both steady22
states.
21  Consumption is the same in both cases and in the lower bound steady state
households are satiated with real money balances (see Appendix 1 for the details).
The equilibrium configuration near the lower bound steady state (
L Ω  in Figure 2) is
neutral and cyclical.
It is also possible to characterise the global dynamics of the model.  From equation
(17) and the normal version of equation (18) it follows that the integral curves in c π −  space
in the normal zone ( 0 c >  and  ˆ ππ ≥ ) are given by:
*2 (1 )




βγ π π π
−
+( − = − + + (20)
where k is an arbitrary constant.  Provided  ()
2* 2 (1 ) 2(1 ) [ ( )ln ] 0 kc g y c γπ γ β −+ − − + − ≥ ,
the integral curves in the normal zone are therefore given by
()
2* 2
* (1 ) 2(1 ) [ ( )ln ]
1
kc g y c γπ γ β
ππ
γ
−+ − − + −
=±
−
From equation (17) and the lower bound version of equation (18) it follows that the
integral curves in c π −  space in the lower bound zone (c > 0,  ˆ ππ ≤ ) are given by
2 1
[) l n ] ( )
2
M cg yc i k βδ π π +( − = − − + (21)
where k is again an arbitrary constant.  Provided  ()
2 () 2[ ( ) l n ] 0 M ik c g y c δβ −+−+ − ≥ , the
integral curves in the lower bound zone are therefore given by:
22
()
** **2 2[ ( ) l n ] kc g y c ππ π β =± + − + − .
The normal zone configuration is a center.
23  A linear approximation of the dynamic
system at the normal steady state has two pure imaginary roots.
24  Some neighbourhood of the
                                                          
21 In that case the two steady states coincide.
22 Note that 
**
M i δπ −=
23 Anne Sibert provided the mathematical solution for the behaviour of the system in the two
zones.23
normal steady state is completely filled by closed integral curves, each containing the steady
state in its interior.  The lower bound zone configuration is a saddlepoint.  A linear
approximation at the lower bound steady state has one positive and one negative
characteristic root.
On the boundary of the two regions (when  ˆ ππ = ) and at a given level of
consumption, the slope of the integral curve in the normal zone is the same as the slope of the
integral curve in the lower bound zone.  This means that the center orbits of the normal zone
and the saddlepoint solution trajectories of the lower bound zone merge smoothly into each
other at the boundary between the two regions.  Figure 2 shows the ‘merged’, global solution
trajectories spanning the two zones.  In all essential respects, this represents the model
analysed by BSU [1999a] with  0. M i =
As pointed out by BSU [1999a,b], there exists a plethora of solutions for this model,
including some strange deflationary equilibria.  A (two-dimensional) continuum of solutions
exists even if we impose the usual a-priori restriction that explosively divergent solutions are
ruled out, if these solutions at some point violate feasibility constraints.  The multiplicity of
non-explosive solutions in this model is due to the fact that both the inflation rate and
consumption are non-predetermined state variables.  This means that for neither state variable
the boundary condition takes the form of an initial condition given by history.  We impose the
standard condition that discontinuous changes in the level of private consumption and the rate
of inflation are permitted only at instants that news arrives.  Except at such instants, solutions
for c and π  are required to be continuous functions of time.
The solutions that are permissible and ‘well-behaved’ are all orbits contained within
the orbit (drawn with reference to the normal steady state 
N Ω ) that passes through (and just
                                                                                                                                                                                    
24 That is, two complex conjugate roots with zero real parts.24
‘touches’) the lower bound steady state 
L Ω .  It is shown as the shaded area in Figure 2.  The
highest rate of inflation for which there exists at least one solution that will not eventually
land the system in the permanent lower bound zone is π .  Candidate solutions starting
outside this orbit will explode.  The explosive trajectories will sooner or later exhibit ever
increasing rates of deflation (negative inflation) and consumption rising without bound.  To
the left of the vertical line NL through  ˆ π , the short nominal interest rate is at the lower
bound,  M ii = .  For trajectories that lie completely to the left of NL, the entire term structure
of interest rates is stuck at  M i , that is, nominal interest rates at all maturities are at their lower
bound.  Note that for any initial rate of inflation, there always exist solutions that will cause
the system to end up in the permanent lower bound zone.
With all nominal interest rates eventually at their lower bound, the rising rates of
deflation characteristic of the explosive solution trajectories have ever rising real interest
rates.  From the consumption Euler equation, the growth rate of consumption will be rising
steadily.  This explosive growth of consumption does not run into a binding capacity
constraint, because the capacity constraint in this model,  y , does not represent a strict upper
bound to actual output.  With either the Old-Keynesian or the New-Keynesian Phillips curve,
actual output can exceed capacity output by any amount.  This should be seen as a weakness
of these models.  Within the strict logic of the model, however, the hyper-deflationary
solutions cannot be ruled out a-priori.
We saw in Section III.1 that, in the Old-Keynesian model, raising the target rate of
inflation, 
* π , had no effect on the behaviour of the economic system if it were to find itself
with a rate of inflation below the lower bound steady-state rate of inflation (
**
M i ππ δ <= − ).
A similar proposition applies in the New Keynesian model.25
Note first that, from Figure 2, for any initial inflation rate below 
** π  there exists no
solution that will not, sooner or later, end up in the permanent lower bound zone, with
nominal interest rates at all maturities stuck at their lower bound.
25  Since 
** π  is independent
of 
* π , the range of low values of the initial inflation rate that will land the economy into this
permanent lower bound zone is unaffected by the level of the target rate of inflation.
Second, note that the value of  ˆ π , the critical inflation rate below which the short
(strictly the instantaneous) nominal interest rate is at its lower bound, is actually raised by an
increase in the target rate of inflation.
26
Of course, the normal steady-state rate of inflation also increases one-for-one with an
increase in 
* π , and π , the highest inflation rate for which there exists at least one solution
that does not end up in the permanent lower bound zone also increases as 
* π  increases.
27
Can Expectational Stability be used to rule out certain rational expectations equilibria?
In a number of papers and books, Evans and Honkapohja [2001] have proposed that
only those rational expectations equilibria that satisfy a condition or refinement called
expectational stability or E-stability, should be considered admissible.  A rational
                                                          
25 The model has no trouble handling the experiment of, say, an unanticipated, immediate and
permanent increase in 
* π .  We do not accept the argument that, since a change in 
* π is a
change in policy regime (in a parameter of the policy rule), rational expectations (assumed
throughout) cannot reasonably be applied to analyse what transitional effects would occur in
response to such a regime change.  Once the economy has a rate of inflation so low that the
system will eventually end up in the permanent lower bound zone (that is, a rate of inflation
below 
** π , the only thing a private agent must know in order to respond to a change in 
* π  in
the manner we assume, is that 
** π  is independent of 
* π .  She does not have to know the new
value of 
* π , or even that it has changed.  All she has to know is that 
* π does not matter.  If
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expectations equilibrium is E-stable if it is locally asymptotically stable under least squares
learning.  McCallum [2001, 2002] also argues that ‘non-fundamental’ solutions, such as the
explosively deflationary solutions of our model, are of dubious relevance because they are not
‘adaptively learnable’, whereas the well-behaved solutions are.  ‘Reasonable learning
mechanisms’, ‘adaptive learning’ and related notions and concepts are a major new area of
economic enquiry.  We cannot possibly hope to do it justice here and have to limit ourselves
to the briefest possible expression of our reservations about the use of these refinements in
dynamic macroeconomic models like ours.
Our objections to the proposition that rational expectations equilibria are not
economically interesting if they are not E-stable are no less pertinent for not being original.
There is only one way to be fully informed and rational.  There are infinitely many ways of
being ‘reasonable’, ‘boundedly rational’ etc.  Any particular adaptive learning rule, such as
the recursive least squares of Evans and Honkapohjah, is ad-hoc and arbitrary, unless there is
empirical evidence, say from cognitive psychology, that empirically it is a reasonable
representation of how agents tend to behave in the kind of circumstances described by the
model.  We have so far seen no evidence to this effect.
The adaptive learning of the 1990s does not appear to get us much beyond the
adaptive expectations of the 1960s.  The point of the ‘rational expectations revolution’ was to
cut through the intractable knot of ‘boundedly rational learning’ by making a very strong
equilibrium assumption.
28  We view the assumption of rational expectations as an appropriate,
indeed essential, application of Occam’s razor.
                                                          
28 There are some technical issues making the Evans-Honkapohja and McCallum E-stability
test problematic.  Our New-Keynesian rational expectations model is non-linear.  Robust E-
stability results only have been established for linear models.  In addition, our adaptive27
Eliminating the lower bound equilibria by paying a negative interest rate on currency.
As in the Old-Keynesian model, substituting equation (10) for equation (9) eliminates
the lower bound equilibria, the lower bound steady state 
** ππ =  and indeed the whole lower
bound zone ( ˆ π  does not exist).  The entire state space (any value for π , any positive value
for c) is covered by closed orbits.  The saddlepoint trajectories have been eliminated.  By
keeping the short nominal interest rate on currency at or below the short nominal interest rate
on non-monetary financial instruments, the behaviour of the model in c π −  space is the same
as that of an economy with a constant nominal interest rate on currency (set at zero, say) for
which the lower bound on the short nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial
instruments is simply ignored.
IV.  Conclusion.
To avoid the zero bound equilibrium trap, or to get out of one once an economy has
landed itself in it, there are just two policy options.  The first is to wait and hope for some
positive shock (fiscal, private or external) to the effective demand for goods and services.
The second option is to lower the zero nominal interest rate floor by taxing currency.  If a rule
were followed that kept the nominal interest rate on currency systematically at or below the
nominal interest rate on non-monetary instruments, the economy could never end up in a zero
bound equilibrium or in a liquidity trap.  Such a rule would require the authorities to be able
to pay interest, negative or positive, on currency, that is, to turn currency into ‘Gesell money’.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
learners would have to master continuous time estimation in order to use recursive least
squares in our model.  These are minor issues, however.28
The transactions and administrative costs associated with what amounts to periodic
currency reforms would be non-trivial.
29  Such carry tax administration costs (currency
conversion costs) could be reduced by lengthening the interval between tax assessments
(conversions), but they would remain significant.
The cost of administering a ‘carry tax’ on base money has to be set against the costs of
two alternatives.  The first is the cost of keeping the nominal interest rate on currency at zero
and risking ending up in a zero lower bound equilibrium.  The second is the cost of keeping
the nominal interest rate on currency at zero and pursuing a high nominal interest rate policy
in order to minimise the risk of ending up in a zero lower bound equilibrium.
30  With a zero
nominal interest rate on currency, the short nominal interest rate on non-monetary financial
instruments is the opportunity cost of holding currency.  The Allais-Baumol-Tobin view of
the demand for money, which applies in our New-Keynesian model, implies that as the
opportunity cost of money rises shoeleather costs go up and real resources are wasted in more
frequent trips to the bank.  Our simple example of a rule for paying interest on currency
maintains a constant, non-negative wedge between the short nominal interest rate on bonds
and the nominal interest rate on currency.  Under this rule, the opportunity cost of holding
currency is constant, and therefore independent of level of the nominal interest rate on bonds.
By reducing the wedge to zero, the economy can be moved arbitrarily close to satiation with
real money balances; a zero wedge is also an equilibrium.
A high nominal interest rate policy will be a policy of high anticipated inflation.  The
costs of anticipated inflation include the menu costs associated with any nonzero rate of
                                                          
29 Marking currency periodically, say by stamping it, in order to certify it ‘current’ as regards
interest due, is logistically equivalent to replacing an existing currency by a new currency,
that is, a currency reform.
30 The need to trade off the administrative cost of a negative nominal interest rate policy
against the opportunity cost of avoiding the zero bound has been emphasised by Goodfriend
[2000, pp. 1017-8] and by Buiter and Panigirtzoglou [1999, pp 21-2 and 38-9].29
inflation, as well as any further costs resulting from imperfect indexation in the private and
public sectors.  Empirically, higher inflation also tends to be more volatile and more uncertain
inflation, which imposes further costs (see e.g. Fischer [1981, 1994]).  It is not obvious that
currency carry tax administration costs would necessarily exceed shoeleather costs, menu
costs and the costs associated with non-zero output gaps.  Paying negative interest on base
money may turn out to be of more than academic interest.30
Appendix 1.  A Model of the Lower Bound Trap
We model a simple, closed endowment economy with a single perishable commodity
that can be consumed privately or publicly.
Households
A representative infinite-lived, competitive consumer maximises for all  0 t ≥  the
utility functional given in (A1.1) subject to his instantaneous flow budget identity (A1.2), his
solvency constraint (A1.3) and his initial financial wealth.  We use the simplest money-in-
the-direct-utility-function approach to motivate a demand for money even when it is
dominated as a store of value.  Instantaneous felicity therefore depends on consumption and
real money balances.  We define the following notation; c is real private consumption, y is
real output, τ  is real (lump-sum) taxes, M is the nominal stock of base money (currency), B is
the nominal stock of short (zero maturity) non-monetary debt, i is the instantaneous risk-free
nominal interest rate on non-monetary debt,  M i , is the instantaneous risk-free nominal interest
rate on money (or the ‘own’ rate on money), P is the price level in terms of money, a is the
real stock of private financial wealth, m is the stock of real currency and b the stock of real
non-monetary debt.
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The household budget identity (A2) can be rewritten as follows
() M ar ay c i i m τ ≡+ − − + −  (A1.6)







 is the instantaneous rate of inflation.
The household solvency constraint can now be rewritten as
()
lim ( ) 0
vrud u t ea v v
−  ≥ →∞ (A1.8)
and the intertemporal budget constraint for the household sector can be rewritten as:
()
() () [ () () ]() () ()
vrud u t ec v v i v i v m v y v d v a t t M τ
−  ∞  ++− − ≤   (A1.9)
The first-order conditions for an optimum imply that the solvency constraint will hold
with equality.  Also,
() cr c δ =−  (A1.10)





=  − 
(A1.11)
If ii M < , currency would dominate non-monetary financial assets (‘bonds’) as a store
of value.  Households would wish to take infinite long positions in money, financed by32
infinite short positions in non-monetary securities.  The rate of return on the portfolio would
be infinite.  This cannot be an equilibrium.
If ii d = , currency and bonds are perfect substitutes as stores of value.  This will, from
the point of view of the household’s utility functional, be the first-best equilibrium,
characterised by satiation in real money balances.  With the logarithmic utility function,
satiation occurs only when the stock of money is infinite.  Provided the authorities provide
government money and absorb private bonds in the right (infinite) amounts, this can be an
equilibrium.
There is a continuum of identical consumers whose aggregate measure is normalised
to  1.   The individual relationships derived in this section therefore also characterise the
aggregate behaviour of the consumers.  The consumption function for our model is
[( ) ( ) ] () ()
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Government
The budget identity of the consolidated general government and central bank is given
in (A1.12).  The level of real public consumption is denoted  0 g ≥ .
() M MBi Bi MP g τ +≡ + + −  (A1.13)
Again, the initial nominal value of the government’s financial liabilities is
predetermined,  (0) (0) (0) M BA += .
This budget identity can be rewritten as
() M ar ag i i m τ ≡+ − + −  (A1.14)
The government solvency constraint is
()








Equations (A1.14) and (A1.15) imply the intertemporal government budget constraint:
[]
()
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∞ −  +− − ≥  (A1.16)
Government consumption spending is exogenous.  To ensure that public consumption
spending does not exceed total available capacity resources,  0 y > , we therefore impose
g y < .  With a representative consumer, this model will exhibit debt neutrality or Ricardian
equivalence.  Without loss of generality, we therefore assume that lump-sum taxes are
continuously adjusted to keep the nominal stock of public debt (monetary and non-monetary)
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Appendix 2.  Calvo’s model of staggered price setting
Calvo’s model views monopolistically competitive individual price setters as facing
randomly timed opportunities for changing the nominal price of their product.  The timing of
opportunities to change the price is governed by a Poisson process with parameter  0 λ > .
There is a continuum of price setters distributed evenly on the unit circle.  The parameter λ
therefore measures not only the instantaneous probability of any price setter’s contract being
up for a change, but also the fraction of the population of price setters changing contract
prices at any given moment.  The model assumes perfect foresight.  It implies that the (natural
logarithm of) the current contract price, w,  is a forward-looking moving average with
exponentially declining weights of the logarithm of the (expected) future general price level,
ln p P ≡ , and of (expected) future excess demand, that is
{}




wt ps ys y e d s e e w
λλ λ τ




→∞ =+ − +
>
 (A2.1)
The current contract price w(t) is therefore a non-predetermined state variable.
The general price level, p, is a backward-looking, exponentially declining moving

















The (natural logarithm of the) general price level is therefore a predetermined state
variable.  From (A2.1) and (A2.2) it follows that the rate of inflation of the general price
level,  p π ≡  , is given by
() [ () ]
t
ty s y d s k πλ ϕ
∞
=− +  (A2.3)35
where k is an arbitrary constant, which can be given the interpretation of the long-run rate of
inflation, that is,  lim ( ) k τ πτ →∞ = .  This implies the following ‘quasi-accelerationist’ Phillips
curve
() [ () ] ty t y πλ ϕ =− −  (A2.4)
Thus in Section III.2, we have  0 β λ ϕ ≡− < .
The key distinction between (A2.4) and the old-style backward-looking accelerationist
Phillips curve is that in (A2.4), the rate of inflation,  p π ≡  , is, unlike the price level, p, a non-
predetermined or ‘forward-looking’ state variable.36
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